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BOOK REVIEWS
and was sentenced to San Quentin prison, but the convictions were subsequently reversed upon appeal due to some legal technicalities involving entrapment and erroneous instructions given the jury by the trial
judge. People v. Werner, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 126, 84 P. (2d) 168
(1938); People v.Werner, 101 P. (2d) 513 (1940); People v.Werner,
16 Cal. (2d) 216, 105 P. (2d) 927 (1940).
In conclusion, therefore, the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States that have dealt with the validity of retraction statutes have held
them to be unconstitutional where they deprive persons of the recovery
of general damages in actions for defamation on the following grounds:
1. That compensatory damages for a wrong are property and a
person cannot be deprived of his property by legislative enactments except by due process of law.
2. That privileges and immunities are given to one class of persons,
namely newspaper publishers and radio broadcasters, which are
denied to other classes.
Maurice J.Moriarty
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HANDBOOK OF TEE CONFLICT OF LAWS. Third Edition. By Herbert
F. Goodrich,' assisted by Paul A. Wolkin.2 St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1949. Pp. xix, 729. $6.50.-The first edition of Judge
Goodrich's text in 1927 and the second in 1938 enjoyed a well-merited
popularity. This reviewer found them most useful in introducing beginning students to the complexities of the Conflict of Laws. The developing case law of the past decade amply justified a third edition.
Many chapters in the new edition, which follows the general arrangement of subjects of its predecessors, remain substantially unchanged. Indeed the black-letters have, for the most part, stood up
well during the past ten unstable years. The Williams Cases3 and
the retreat from Haddock v. Haddock 4 are reflected in the revision of
the chapter on Divorce which came late enough to footnote "confusion's masterpiece"-Rice v. Rice.5 Chapter Three is a valiant effort
to set forth the Conflict of Laws of Taxation in some seventy pages in
a day when eager legislatures are in quest of new financial pastures.

1 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
2 Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
8 325 U.S.226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945); 317 U. S. 287, 63 S.
Ct. 807, 87 L. Ed.279 (1942).

4 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 59 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
5 ....
U.S.....,
69 S. Ct. 756 (1949).
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Though the revision of this chapter presented "some puzzles," 6 as
the author puts it, he has modestly submitted it as "probably accurate,"
if there is "a common law of Conflict of Laws of taxation." 7 The
caveat suggests the gradual merging of Conflict of Laws questions into
questions of Constitutional Law.
In his preface, Judge Goodrich says that "as years go by ... there
seems to me to be less compulsion about Conflict of Laws rules except
as the Constitution provides the compulsion." 8 We have seen evidence
of the readiness of the Supreme Court to strike down under the Due
Process Clause "egregious blunders" in the choice of law by state
courts. The extension of Constitutional Law to control such problems
may be all the more necessary now that Swift v. Tyson 9 is gone after
a century on our books and federal courts must follow the Conflict of
Laws rules of the states in which they sit, under the implications of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.10 Conflict of Laws has, nevertheless, lost
neither its integrity nor its function to ascertain the rules which should
properly inform the constitutional clauses to which the Supreme Court
will turn. Judge Goodrich sees the fading of any "categorical imperative" behind traditional conflicts rules."
It may still be asked, however, whether there is not an objective standard discoverable in the
field of Conflict of Laws as elsewhere? If so, some of us may not yet
be ready to scrap all that the master, Beale, has taught us, however
fashionable it has become to give him the bad name of "dogmatist."
The present edition contains an excellent discussion of the Conflict
of Laws in the field of Workmen's Compensation. Judge Goodrich
cites the amendment to Section 403 of the Restatement as possibly
reconciling Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt 12 and Industrial Commission v. McCartin.13 Whether the late Justice Murphy's somewhat
puzzling language in the latter case has drained the life blood from the
former is for the reader to decide. It would seem that the "end is
not yet" with regard to "double" recoveries in Workmen's Compensation when the employee-claimant is injured in the course of employment in a state other than the state of the contract.
Most interesting in the new edition is the author's apparent abandonment of the "vested rights" theory so consistently followed in the
earlier editions, in favor of the "local law" theory. We were quite unprepared for the change. The brief discussion of Conflict of Laws the6 Preface, p. v.
7 Id. at vi.
8 See note 6 supra.
9
10

16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).

11
12

See note 6 supra.
320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149 (1943).

18

330 U. S. 622, 67 S. Ct. 886, 91 L. Ed. 1140 (1947).
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ories in the introductory chapter accepted Professor Cheatham's eclecticism that "the policies behind all of these theories (comity, vested
rights and local law) have validity. This suggests that they are not entirely mutually exclusive. Indeed there may be a gain in using different theories at different places to make more readily apparent the change
in policies deemed dominant as the situations vary." 14 From the
present text, however, it seems that the author has not found "situations" in which applying the "vested rights" theory is a "gain." Language even faintly suggesting the latter theory is rigorously expurgated. 15 Where the earlier editions stated the basis of Conflict of Laws
rules to be "the principle of civilized law that rights once vested under
the law . . .are recognized and enforced though they have come into
being in another state," 16 the present edition declares that the forum
"will look to the law of the other state or states involved, and consonant with other considerations that may be of concern, seek a result conforming to this law." '2 Again, it is somewhat startling to see Slter v.
Mexican RailroadCo.' 8 cited in the third edition apparently in support
of the "local law" theory, when the same case was cited in the second
edition as an illustration of the "vested rights" theory. 19 Surely some
explanation for the change was due to the student. None appears. The
introductory comment in Chapter One, consisting of three short paragraphs on the various theories, is inadequate.
These remarks perhaps indicate the shortcomings of the hornbook
method. Limitations of space may be offered in explanation. But, having abandoned the "vested rights" theory, some exposition of its defiencies was in order. The student will learn soon enough that the Conflict of Laws has always been the happy hunting ground of the philosophic jurist intent on his own particular philosophy of law. He will
need much more than the present edition to enable him to make up
his mind as to the relative values of the various theories. For it is not
the difference in actual results reached through an application of the
"vested rights" or "local law" theories which matters so much. Often,
similar results are reached through either theory. It is rather the underlying philosophy of law in general, implicit in one or the other theory, which should be of major concern.
When Judge Goodrich issued his first edition, it brought down upon
it the academic wrath of "realists" and "functionalists"--so happy in
their subjectivist blue heaven. The text was frowned upon as "conceptualism" retarding the "scientific" study of Conflict of Laws via
14 Text, 3d ed., at 10.
15 Id. at 21, 29, 252, 254, 272, 322.

16 Text, 2d ed., at 11.
17 Note 14 supra, at 14.

18 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900 (1904), cited in text, at 272-3.
19 Note 16 suPra,at 220.
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the "inductive method." Realist and functionalist wrath reached a
crescendo when the Restatement elaborately black-lettered Conflict of
Laws in 1934 under "Bealish" auspices. Not in the least deterred, the
author, still following the "vested rights" theory and strengthened by
the Restatement, issued a second edition. Now comes the apparent
surrender in the third edition. We can only ask "why?" The critical
reader may wonder whether a text so completely written from a "vested
rights" point of veiw can be made a consistent piece of revision by the
device of excising "vested rights" language and inserting "local law"
terminology. If eclecticism in the face of competing theories is understandable, to demand a reason for the choice as made is not impertinent. Realists and functionalists denounced the "hornbook" method
as an invitation to "dogmatism." Will they acquiesce in the "hornbook" method now that the "local law" theory has found its way into
hornbook black-letters?
At any rate, the present third edition in the hands of an alert and
careful student will provoke some thinking on his part. If a hornbook
accomplishes that-and Judge Goodrich's text certainly does-little
more can fairly be asked of it.
Edward F. Barrett*

MR. JUSTIcE BLACK: The Man and His Opinions. By John P.
Frank.' New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Pp. x=x, 357. $4.00.
-It makes no difference whether the readers of this interesting and informative study of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court pay
honest homage to the idealistic abstraction which claims that we have
"a government of laws and not of men," or whether they adhere to the
more realistic, if somewhat discomforting, view that "the Constitution
is what the Supreme Court says it is." In either event they should
agree that Professor Frank's work on Hugo L. Black is stimulating and
scholarly in the proper measure, and that much can be learned from its
pages. Allowing for the affectionate prejudice which Professor Frank
bears toward a man under whom he served as law clerk, and which, incidentally, he acknowledges in an honest admission of the possibility bf
restricted objectivity, the author has presented us with a book which
lays bare the legal philosophy of Justice Black and the life out of which
that philosophy has been hewn. The picture which emerges, and the
reviewer confesses the same partisanship toward Justice Black as the
author manifestly holds, is one of a man who lives and breathes the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1

Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
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philosophy of government for the common good, with no exceptions tolerated, even in the hearts and minds of Supreme Court Justices.
The technique used by Professor Frank is not by any means novel.
Nevertheless, the method of combining a fairly comprehensive biographical sketch of Mr. Justice Black's life with numerous and very
typical selections from opinions which he has written while serving on
the highest bench, proves to be one singularly adapted to furnish a
clear portrait of Hugo Black, the man, and the judge. Some miay
object to this biographic-casebook combination. They may complain
that it is too great a mental jump from the easy examination of young
Hugo in the earthy surroundings of the Birmingham, Alabama, police
court, to the heavy intellectual digestion of his legal philosophy as it is
culled out of the rarified atmosphere of Supreme Court opinions. However, in the mind of this reviewer, the switch is well worth the effort.
For Professor Frank's technique allows those who wish to take the
time to see how a man's judicial philosophies, prejudices, and predilections are the fruitions'of his life, his experience, and are not given full
grown to him, either by the formal presentation of a jurisprudential holy
spirit, or awarded to him in an additional, but invisible, diploma upon
graduation from law school.
In the biographical material, which occupies the first one hundred
and eight pages of the book, we see, in a somewhat abrupt but nevertheless satisfactory fashion, the long transition from son of a middle
class Alabama store-keeper to senior Justice of the Supreme Court.
Though the road is a long one, its course is steady, its progress consistent. From a youth in which he first became captivated by the philosophy of people's democracy, as preached then by the Populists,
through the trials that he faced as a young lawyer with unions and
working people as his main clients, to the hectic days as candidate for
political office, then sweeping through the days of his senatorship, first
quiet and then bursting with the fire of his intense liberalism, finally
to rest upon the summit of his great achievement, appointment to the
Supreme Court, Hugo Black comes off well. True, he may have been a
prohibitionist, and perhaps Professor Frank has somewhat played down
his association with the Klan (which was to plague him in such great
measure upon his appointment to the supreme bench); yet the sketch
of the author outlines clearly the sources of Hugo Black's convictions.
His sympathy with the poor white and the Negro, his humane dispensation of justice in the police court, his avid reading of Jefferson, his
friendship with Alfred E. Smith, his apprenticeship under the great
George E. Norris while Black was a neophyte senator--all combine to
produce a man whose true merit is not yet appreciated by his times.
It would be beyond the proper purpose of a book review to take up
analysis of the many opinions written by Justice Black which the book
contains. Suffice to say the author has divided them into sections
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entitled: Extent of Federal Power; Extent of State Power; Pr6blems of
Regulation; Basic Theory of Civil Rights; Speech, Press, Religion;
Fair Trial; Marriage and Divorce; and Aliens. Here we see vividly,
in his own simple but so often- strong words, a Supreme Court Justice
who believes that the power to govern is in the hands of the people,
both on the national and state level, to be exercised when necessary, as
fully as possible within the great generalities of the Constitution. This
power to govern is not one to be vitiated by the hampering restrictions
of judges who happen to have different economic and political views
from those reflected in the legislative will. Black appears as a Twentieth Century "states'-righter," who would deny to the Court the prerogative of striking down state regulation and taxation which they feel
burdens interstate commerce. Such evaluation of economic and fiscal
policies he would leave to the Congress. A firm believer in real "free
enterprise," he calls for vigorous enforcement of the anti-trust laws.
Equally devout in his belief in free labor, he supports in his opinions
legislation which gives the widest possible protection to the working
man whether it be wage-hour or workmen's compensation legislation.
At only one point does he recoil from giving the widest possible sweep
to the power of representative government, and that is in the field of
personal, or civil, liberties. As Professor Frank phrases it: "Black's
broad notions of the extent of the power to govern does not include
sanction of the power to oppress .... ," 2 Thus Black closely scrutinizes
state and national legislation which might infringe on free speech, press,
fair trial, or the practice of one's religion; and loudly and persistently
does he call upon his colleagues to recognize the original and true intent
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e., that it should impose upon the
states the same restraints over the governmental power, which the Bill
of Rights places on the Federal Government.
Here, then, we see a humanitarian, a latter-day Jefferson with the
same deep faith in his country and with high reverence for representative government on the state and national levels; a judge with a passionate feeling for the people; a man who tolerates nothing less than
the fullest judicial protection of their fundamental liberties. In the
pages of Professor Frank's book we may discern Hugo L. Black as a
man of high moral purpose, of deep philosophical conviction, of great
intellectuality; a man who indeed has lived up to the prophecy which
the late and beloved George E. Norris spoke of him upon his appointment to the Supreme Court: "He is a worthy representative of the
common people. He understands their hopes and ambitions, and their
liberties in his hands will be safe." a
Alfred L. Scanlan*
2 Text, at 118.
8 Text, at I00.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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REVENUE ACT OF 1948, LEGISLATVE HISTORY SERIEs. Edited by
Paul Wolkin and Marcus Manoff.1 Albany, New York: Matthew
Bender and Company, 1948. Pp. xxiv, 667. $10.00.--"Legislative
intent" as revealed outside the printed statutory word has, since the
advent of the New Deal judiciary, been exalted from its one time
position of simple irrelevance 2 into a veritable deus ex inachina. At
an earlier juristic stage, something more than lip service was paid to
the canon of construction asserting the proposition that the best evidence of legislative intent is to be found in the precise words employed
in the statute as finally enacted. It cannot be successfully averred that
greater certainty has been imported into federal tax law by reason of
the abandonment of the older concept.3
The English courts, although operating on the same basic theory
espoused by our own judiciary-the ascertainment of the meaning of
statutory language in which the intent of the legislature is embodiedrefuse to quest after the meaning behind meaning. On the basis of
what may perhaps be termed a parol evidence rule applied to legislation, whereunder earlier drafts and versions admittedly do not embody
the ultimate legislative intent, all but the final words employed in
4
legislation as enacted is ignored by His Majesty's judges.
Our own federal judiciary were once almost as content to make
"a fortress out of the dictionary" 5 as their English brethren. Where,
however, the legislative language employed was ambiguous, our courts
would indulge themselves in the luxury of peeking behind the printed
verbalisms as engrossed to ascertain the legislative intent, if possible,
from extrinsic evidence. From this modest lapse from the strict English
rule, our courts continued their easy descent to Avernus by again looking outside the four corners of the act when the reading of statutory
words in their ordinary sense led to results which seemed absurd or
ridiculous. Next the judicial gaze wandered beyond the strict confines
of the Statutes-at-Large where the plain meaning of the statutory
words employed, although not productive of results actually absurd,
were plainly at variance with the policy behind the legislation as a
whole.
1 Members of the Philadelphia Bar.
Cf., the remarks of Chief Justice Fuller in Dunlap v. United States, 173
U. S. 65, 75, 19 S. Ct. 319, 43 L. Ed. 616 (1899), quoted in Landis, A Note on
2

Statutory Interpretation,43 HA~v. L. Rxv. 886, 890, n. 17 (1930).
3 Compare Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Korell, 176 F. (2d) 152

(2d Cir. 1949), with Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shoong et al ..

F.

(2d) ....
(9th Cir. 1949).

4 Landis, supra note 2.
5 A dictionary, by the way, may well provide just as serviceable material
for fortress building as such amorphous stuff as the unexpressed major premise
that the function of the federal courts is to serve as an adjunct to the Treasury.
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At this point sheer semantics took over, for what is plain and manifest to a judicial Podsnap may be far from crystalline to a mind capable
of questioning first principles. 6 The United States Supreme Court has,
for the present at least, exercised the view that Cum in verbis nulla
ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio, with the observation that "words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is
wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear ...,,7
Of just what, then, does this always relevant legislative history
consist? For all practical purposes a tax lawyer may confine his attention to: (1) prior statutes containing legislative forerunners of the act
to be interpreted; (2) Treasury Regulations and judicial decisions promulgated prior to the enactment of the legislation to be construed, for
knowledge of and acquiescence therein are attributed to the enacting
Congress; 8 (3) all changes made in the section to be construed during
the legislative process of enactment, including earlier unsuccessful
attempts to secure adoption; (4) reports of the House Ways and
Means, Senate Finance and Conference Committees; (5) pertinent
statements made on the floor of either chamber during enactment, with
the remarks and explanations of the bill's managers being entitled to
the greatest weight; (6) testimony taken before the Ways and Means
and Finance Committees at the hearings prior to introduction of the
legislation; and finally (7) budgetary, and latterly (8) veto messages
from the President.
The Messrs. Wolkin and Manoff's Revenue Act of 1948, the first
in a promised series of legislative histories, embraces the 1948 Act and
the changes made thereto in the process of passage, the House and
Senate hearings, the reports of the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees, floor debates, presidential veto message, and House and
Senate debate on enactment over veto. 9 It will thus be seen that a
very comprehensive legislative history is presented of the Revenue Act
of 1948 which enacted into law far-reaching proposals designed to
equate the income, gift and estate tax burdens borne by residents of
common law states with those borne by residents of community property
states, after the gift and estate tax law with respect to community
property had been restored to its pre-Revenue Act of 1942 status.
The editors have, in main, performed their task in a creditable and
workmanlike fashion. Their volume is to be commended to every
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HAmv. L. REv. 863 (1930).
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479, 63 S. Ct. 361, 87 L. Ed.
407 (1943). The words are those of the late Justice Murphy speaking for a
unanimous Court.
8 Cf., Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351, 357, 58 S. Ct. 745, 82 L. Ed. 109
(1938).
9 The Revenue Acts of 1943 and 1948 have the unique distinction of being
enacted into law over a presidential Veto.
6
7
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attorney, who without being personally possessed of all the materials
contained therein, desires to master the intricacies of income "splitting,"
and the "marital' deduction.
In light of the promise of the editors and publisher that additional
volumes in their projected Legislative History Series will be forthcoming, a few constructive criticisms may, perhaps, be in order. The
lack of an index detracts from the value of the volume. The editors'
handling of material from the Congressional Record requires comment
in at least two particulars. Firstly, and most unfortunately, the page
references to the Record are to the original, temporary pagination,
quite different from the proper page citations to the final, bound edition
of the Record. Secondly, the execrably fine print employed in the
Record is reproduced throughout the volume under review. Since this
material is reproduced throughout by photo-offset, it would have been
quite feasible for the fine type used in the Record to have been magnified the requisite number of times to avoid subjecting the reader to
undue eyestrain.
A practical question of economics obtrudes as to the wisdom of
the projected Series. Insofar as the federal revenue acts are concerned,
it must be observed that certain important portions of their legislative history are currently available for moderate sums. The vital
House and Senate Committee Reports have been republished by the
Government Printing Office.' 0 Already in print are an excellent legislative history of the federal income tax laws 11 and of the excess
12
profits tax laws.
Strangely enough, what are not readily available to the tax attorney
are the materials first listed above, that is, a complete set of all prior
federal revenue acts. One compilation goes back only to 1924,13
whereas an attempted overall correlation of federal income, gift and
estate tax statutes covers only 1916 to 1943.14 A masterly edition 1'
10 Committee Reports for the Revenue Acts of 1913-1938 are contained in
the Internal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin 1939-1 (Part 2), obtainable for the
price of $1.00 from the Superintendent of Documents in Washington, D. C. The
Committee Reports for subsequent acts appear in the Cumulative Bulletin for
the year of each respective act. Although these Bulletins are moderately priced,
the years 1944-1945, are, foz example, unobtainable except at inflated prices on the
second-hand market, because of the fact that they are not always kept in print.
11 SEIm
, LEGtsLATVE HISTORy OF FEDERAL INco m TAx LAws, 1938-1861
(1938). This volume, of course, does not extend beyond the income tax field and
then stops with the Revenue Act of 1938.
12 SEmDm , LEoISrT=vx HISTORY oF Excess PROITS TAX LAws, 1946-1917
(1947).
18 See West Publishing Company's compilation, in two volumes with pocket
supplement, of Internal Revenue Acts from 1924 to date, under title 26 of U.S.C.A.
14 BARTON, FEDERAL INcOmE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX LAWS CoRRELATED (9th
ed. 1944) (1939-1943); (8th ed. 1938) (1926-1938, income taxes; 1916-1926, estate
taxes; 1924, 1932, gift taxes).
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of the federal revenue acts from 1909 onward exists, but-stops short
with the year 1940. In addition, the edition is out of print and has
become well-nigh unobtainable.
Complete and accurate copies of the Treasury Regulations for past
revenue acts, although frequently of great importance to the tax
attorney, are essentially unobtainable. Thus it appears that those materials comprising legislative history listed above in both (1) and (2)
are among the most difficult to obtain.
In consequence, it is suggested that any publisher willing to reprint
accurate copies of the revenue acts and Treasury Regulations from
1909 to date would be sure of a continuing market for his volumes
among attorneys, judges, law school and bar association libraries, law
students and the never-ending flow of legal and accounting neophytes
anxiously pressing to transmogrify themselves overnight into tax
"specialists."
What is needed are reprints of all prior revenue acts, copies of all
drafts of each revenue act in the various legislative stages, reprints of
the Treasury Regulations, and reproductions of all pertinent House
and Senate floor discussions of revenue bills, preferably reproduced in
one volume. Little or no editorial comment or even arrangement other
than by sheer chronology is necessary or desirable. Completeness,
accuracy and reasonableness are the three prime essentials. In addition, reproduction by photo-offset is desirable and has the twin merits
of low cost combined with absolute accuracy of reproduction. The
first element must be supplied by the directing intelligence of editor
and publisher.
Robert T. Molloy *

THE CONSTITUTION AND SOcio-EcoNomIc CHANGE (The Thomas
M. Cooley Lectures). By Henry Rottschaefer. 1 Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Law School, 1948. Pp. xvi, 253. $3.50.-This book
comprises five lectures delivered in March, 1947, before the Law
School at the University of Michigan. They inaugurate the endowed
lecture series in memory of Thomas M. Cooley, whose career as professor in the University of Michigan Law School, as a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Michigan, as first chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and as author of the magistral ConstitutionalLimitations, securely established his preeminence among constitutional lawyers and jurists during the latter third of the Nineteenth Century.
15 FE ERAL REvERUE AcTS AND RELATED STATUTES, 1909-1940 (1941)
nue Act Publishing Company, Washington, D. C.).
* Member of the New York Bar.

1 Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

(Reve-
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Cooley viewed the American Constitution as a great living instrument
whose basic principles, though stable, are anything but inflexible and
immutable. He insisted with Chief Justice Marshall that a constitution intended to endure for ages to come must be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.
The years since 1933 undoubtedly constitute one of these crises
in human affairs. The New Deal period has been a time of decided
"socio-economic change" which, in keeping with the Marshall-Cooley
formula, has induced the Supreme Court to reinterpret "at least some
provisions of the Constitution." In fact, Rottschaefer inclines to the
view that the Constitution has been radically altered by the New Deal
judges. Though the transformation may not be as complete as he
implies, few will quarrel with his contention that constitutional revision was necessary and natural in a period of severe and prolonged
economic depression. Even more than the depression itself, the widely
accepted theory of its causes and remedy influenced the judiciary.
A clear majority of the people believed (and still do, the author thinks)
that uncontrolled production and reckless competition inevitably bring
depression since under these conditions farmers and industrial workers
lack sufficient purchasing power to consume the goods produced and
to sustain uninterrupted business operations. The people expected the
New Deal administration and the judiciary to pass and to uphold laws
designed not to introduce socialism but to stabilize the economy and
to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth, the stabilizing
measures being at once the result and the cause of a more even diffusion of the national income. The author's essentially correct estimate
of the New Deal illumines the pages of a necessarily difficult book.
In his first chapter, Development of Federal Powers Prior to 1933,
the author shows that the virtually unlimited authority of Congress
today to direct the nation's economic life was -implicit in pre-New
Deal judicial construction. Clinging to the views of Chief Justice
Marshall, "the spiritual ancestor of those who have sanctioned" the
recent extension of federal powers, the Supreme Court had denied to
the states concurrent power with Congress to regulate interstate commerce and had upheld acts of Congress destroying commerce in lottery tickets, liquor shipments to prohibition states, and stolen automobiles. Further than this, it is true, the Court had refused to go.
For the most part unsympathetic to labor, the Court in the celebrated
case of Hammer v. Dagenkart2 disallowed the congressional act prohibiting interstate commerce in goods produced by child labor, and
four years later refused to enforce the discriminatory tax against childfabricated articles. In the field of employer-employee relations the
Court in Adair v. United Statess rescinded that section of the
2 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918).
8 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908).
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Erdman Act forbidding interstate railway operators to discharge workers because of membership in labor unions. But twenty-two years later,
in 1930, the Court conceded that the connection between interstate
commerce and union membership was a real and substantial one, sustaining the power of Congress in the Railway Labor Act of 1926 to
prevent employers from interfering with the right of employees to
select freely their own collective bargaining representatives.
The reasoning in this epoch-making case, Texas and New Orleans
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 4 was
used by the Court to bring virtually all industrial relations under the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause during the New Deal "thirties."
If the Court did not explicitly approve of the economic philosophy underlying the New Deal labor legislation, it did agree that low wages, long
hours, child labor and the refusal of employers to recognize and bargain
with labor unions "burdened" interstate commerce and justified federal
regulation of activities once viewed as strictly local. The relevant labor
cases (on whose importance the author lays special stress), the agriculture cases and the Holding Company Act cases are thoroughly, if
not elaborately, analyzed in the light of the Court's changing attitude
toward the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The
author's discussion will convince many readers that the leading New
Deal cases, notably National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corporation,5 United States v. Darby,6 Mulford v.
Smith, 7 Wickard v. Filburn,8 and North American Co. v. Securities
and Exchange Commission,9 are among the most significant in our
judicial history.
In asserting federal powers, the present Court, unlike the pre-1933
Court, has been motivated by the desire to constitutionalize new socioeconomic legislation and not by fear or distrust of the states. In fact,
the new Court has considerably expanded state as well as federal
powers. On the theory that interstate commerce "should pay its way,"
the Court in case after case has permitted particular states to levy use,
gross income and sales taxes on businesses in interstate commerce,
provided, of course, that the tax situation is such that it cannot be
duplicated in other states and thereby destroy or "substantially" burden
the traffic. Federal-state cooperation enjoys the support of the presentday judiciary which upholds acts of Congress designed to help the
states enforce measures deemed socially desirable. The Court has also
overruled the old Marshallian doctrine of inter-governmental immunity
which prevented one level of government from taxing the instrumen281 U. S.
5 301 U. S.
6 312 U. S.
7 307 U. S.
4
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talities of the other. Federal-state relations are now resolved, as the
late Justice Rutledge so aptly phrased it, "by a new, or renewed,
emphasis on facts and practical considerations" rather than by "dogmatic logistics." The Court's present approach has "transferred the
general problem of adjustment to a level more tolerant of both state
and federal legislative action."
Turning from the Commerce Clause and the taxing power, the author
in his chapter, Protection of Personal and Property Rights, discusses
socio-economic change from another angle, namely, the degree of freedom from governmental restraint now enjoyed by individual interests
under the Due Process and Contract Clauses. This chapter is a hodgepodge of cases involving price and rate fixing, state moratory laws,
federal currency legislation and the regulation of industrial relations.
The author's comments on the latter lose some of their timeliness
since they were recorded before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
He anticipated, however, and justified in advance that piece of legislation. Moreover, his generalization is true enough-that today "the
due process clauses protect personal liberty more extensively than
rights of property." A case in point is the decision in Thornhill v.
Alabama,10 written by the late Justice Murphy, declaring mass picketing of a peaceful sort to be a form of free speech or press. Rottschaefer
affirms that the Court conceded equivalent rights of free speech to
employers but failed to enforce them against the "aggressions" of the
National Labor Relations Board.
In his excellent summary chapter, the author is concerned with the
implication of recent trends. Mainly by extending the application of
long accepted principles, the judiciary of today has constitutionalized
the first steps toward governmental economic planning and interposes,
the author fears, no effective obstacles against its further extension.
Though he thinks that the area of economic planning will be enlarged,
he is not convinced that the people will demand state capitalism or
communism, at least not in the foreseeable future. To date, the
planning movement has curtailed only -the economic freedom of big
business groups and has presented no general threat to civil and political liberties. Today, more adequately than during any previous epoch
in American history, the courts protect freedom of speech, of religion
and of the press. By resolutely upholding political and civil rights,
even to the extent of permitting opposition to the established regime
by those who wish peaceably to change it, the courts of our day will
help save us from the degradation of serfdom. For, as he says in
his concluding sentence, the danger "that modem liberalism may spawn
a tyrannous totalitarianism is neither an illusion nor the delusion of
'reactionary' thinking."
Aaron I. Abell *
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THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY. Volume I. By Richard R. Powell.'
Albany, New York: Matthew Bender and Company, 1949. Pp. xm,
792. $16.50.-Lord Coke once said "Let us now peruse our old authors,
for out of the old fields must come the new come." Professor Powell
must have heeded this advice in the preparation of Volume I of his
treatise on the law of Real Property. Although he acknowledges the
importance of twenty-eight years of personal experience in the field
and the contributions of thousands of students, he reiterates that "law
is found in the books" and that Real Property law can be understood
only in the light of its historical evolution. In recognition of the
futility of attempting to incorporate the law of Real Property into five
volumes, he has attempted something more than the restatement of
accepted rules as derived from and influenced by historical considerations.
The objective has been threefold: to integrate the whole subject,
to examine current problems with respect to the evolution of property
principles, and to stress and consider the importance of the statutory
factor. Emphasis has been placed on the individual states, territories,
and possessions of the United States and the indigenous laws thereof
to explain the varying degrees of acceptance, enforcement and modification of the English common law. Students and practitioners alike
may see therein the reason for the complexity and nonconformity of
the property law of their particular jurisdiction. In Part I, a single
chapter entitled Sources of American Law constitutes the largest, if not
the most original and valuable, portion of the book. Part II, entitled
Capacity to Hold and Deal with Interests in Land, while overshadowed
by Part I in emphasis and length, has not been neglected. It has received the succinct integrated treatment which has been the author's
purpose.
An examination of the theory of property is, of course, germane to
any attempted integration of the subject. Although only eight pages
are devoted to the question, Professor Powell follows his procedure of
stating the problem followed by citations to sources which in turn contain exhaustive citations of the authorities. This method is invaluable
when considered in the light of the contemporary query as to whether
there is a natural right to property or whether the only justification for
private ownership lies in the function of property in terms of its social
contribution. Especially noteworthy is the statement of the theory
that property exists as a natural right: "The right to possession is a direct right, inalienable, antecedent to all law, and instituted for the
general good." 2
1 Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University, and Reporter on Property
for the American Law Institute.
2 Text, at 12.
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The author, in Volume I at least, has accomplished his objective.
The Law of Real Property, by Powell, is a significant addition to this
field, not only because it represents a needed modern integration of the
subject, but as a basic tool for student, research fellow or practitioner.
The treatise is fraught with promise. If the succeeding volumes follow
the pattern and precedent established herewith, a worthy successor to
Tiffany's standard text has been found. Judgment thereon is accordingly reserved.
Robert E. Sullivan*
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